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FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE UNIVERSITY 
AND THE COMMUNITY
The subject I am to  discuss in this paper is so extensive that I am 
obliged to  restrict myself to a specific problem-area. This restric­
tion, however, is not an arbitrary one. It is guided by the altered 
place and function of m odem  science in our highly developed 
civilization. In this address emphasis will be placed on the position 
and function of science, rather than that of the university. This 
shift in emphasis is not coincidental. To gain insight into the 
future of universities, one should have clarity about the present 
and expected future róle of science in our society.
For the purpose of this address, I intend to proceed as follows:
* Firstly, determine the position and role of science in society,
* secondly, indicate, according to this role, the mutual and un­
avoidable interdependence between science and politics, and
* finally, remark on the implications this would have for the uni­
versity.
1. The position and function of science in contem porary society
The twentieth century is without any doubt the age of science 
and technology. Present-day society is, in fact, to  a great extent 
the product of science and technology, a society in which science 
has lost its “social innocence” to the extent that it cannot claim 
neutrality towards a development for which it was and still is 
responsible. The reality facing us today is that of science 
becoming increasingly “ socialized” and society itself becoming 
“ scientized” . It would not be an exaggeration to claim that for 
his mere survival, man has become dependent on science and 
technology.
As recently as a century ago, science stood at the periphery of so- 
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cial and economic events. As such it did not have any remarkable 
influence; especially since science was practised for the sake of 
knowledge and only that. In fact, it was assumed that science was 
to be practised primarily for the sake of science, to the exclusion 
of everything else.
The situation has since, however, changed radically: science has 
become an available'commodity, a ready instrum ent of service in 
everyday life, to the extent that one can today speak of a change 
from science as theoria, i.e. practice of science for the sake of 
knowledge, to science as praxis, i. e. practice of science as a 
service to human existence. This becomes increasingly apparent 
when one considers the “practical side” thereof, i.e. technology, 
where science has left the confinements of the laboratory and 
armchair and finds itself in the centre of society. Science today is 
not only confined to  something as m undane as toothpaste or as 
essential as war-materials, but has become an undeniable and 
decisive determ inant in m an’s existence. In our so-called 
“planned society” science has become one of the central driving 
forces in the socio-economic and social processes of the world in 
which we live.
Science and technology have changed our “ natural world” into 
an artificial “ selfmade world” . “ Free nature” has disappeared be­
hind a barrier of glass, plastic, steel and concrete (Roszak, 1973: 
3ff). It is for this reason that we nowadays tire compelled to 
preserve in nature-reserves anything in nature which still remains 
untouched by m an’s destructive hand. It is an indisputable fact 
that our present physical environment is not only and primarily 
the result of science and technology, but that it is also main­
tained largely by science and technology. Whereas one could 
speak in past eras of our history of a “hunting culture” or 
“agrarian culture” , because hunting or agriculture determined 
the structure of those societies, we can instead today speak of 
a “scientific culture” (Snijders, 1971:53; Schelsky, 1961), albeit 
in its initial stages.
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Considering the implications thereof, we have to conclude that a 
so-called neutral and “ disinterested” science has nowadays be­
come a political factor and instrum ent for power of no mean 
size. It was for this very reason that H.G. Wells could declare that 
the history of man had become a race between knowledge and 
catastrophe. W ithout any doubt knowledge has become an instru­
m ent of power — a fact illustrated by the strong correlation be­
tween the “knowledge explosion” of recent decades and the 
rapid industrial and economic developments of modern times.
The “scientization” of our society and the “socialization” of 
science have turned knowledge into an im portant tool of control, 
influence and manipulation —, and that no t only of nature, but 
also o f man. This state of affairs calls for a radically revised look 
at the position and role of the academician and scientifically 
trained person. Formerly, the concept of “disinterested science” 
implied a rigid division between the practice of “pure” science on 
the one hand, and the practice of more mundane and “purpose­
ful ” activities like politics on the o ther hand. This division of 
roles was supported by a strict institutionalized division which 
demanded of the academic that he confine himself exclusively to 
“ theoretical considerations” and leave “practical politics” to 
those with “ experience” — whether they were equipped or not.
This situation has changed radically. According to  Dippel (1962: 
62), the race is on for the recruiting of scientists, for practical 
results and for influence on scientific resources: the universities 
and other institutions of higher education. This race extends it­
self to influence over the shaping of scientists and the nature of 
the results, a state of affairs confirmed by the well-known Steel- 
man Report of 1947. According to the opening remarks of this 
report the safety and the prosperity of the United States de­
pended as never before on the rapid development or expansion of 
scientific knowledge. The latter has come to be regarded as a 
prime factor in the safeguarding of the existence of the United 
States, to such an extent that the laboratory was regarded as the 
first line of defence and the scientist an indispensable corn-
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batant. It would seem as if the romanticized conception of the 
scientist as being free from social strictures and involvement has 
become a utopian delusion. In spite of the problems inherent in 
this situation, there are positive elements involved, viz. the aware­
ness that scientific objectivity does not necessarily imply indif­
ference and independence but that the scientist can maintain his 
scientific and academic integrity without sacrificing the oppor­
tunity of assuming a critical attitude towards social and political 
realities.
Thus science has today become an instrum ent of power and has 
established new dependencies. The most im portant of these is the 
mutual dependence of science and politics.
2. The mutual dependence of science and politics
It has become increasingly accepted in our scientifically orien­
tated culture that politics has become largely dependent on tech­
nological insight and scientific advice and information. The prac­
tice of politics has developed to the point where more is de­
manded than mere instant solutions based on already 
experienced situations or emotionally cosseted ideological ends. 
It demands the form ulation of problems, the devising of strate­
gies to solve them , in the light of expected situations and proper­
ly planned means. In this respect the academically trained expert 
has a very im portant contribution to make.
In the context of my argument, the concept “politics” should be 
interpreted broadly. It not only refers to the relationship 
between states, but also to the organization of human life w ith­
in the state, an organization which is ultimately responsible for 
the socio-economic and social set-up within a particular state. 
It includes the policies that are followed and the ends visualized 
in order to  regulate and structure human relations and the rela­
tion in which people stand toward their environment and the po­
wers that be. The question arises: to what extent does politics,
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in this sense of the word, rely on science?
As a result of the infiltration of science into just about every 
facet of our lives, science itself, and not merely its results, has 
become an im portant political consideration. It has become, both 
implicitly and explicitly, a determ inant for the policies and 
strategies characterizing a culture. For this reason, concepts such 
as science, politics and the future cannot be seen in isolation any 
m ore. It is therefore wishful thinking to regard politics as the sole 
“p roperty” o f dedicated party politicians or ideological activists. 
For, while the so-called “practical politicians” are ever more 
determ inedly involving themselves in the changing appearance of 
our world (a change occasioned by technological advances) they 
are increasingly faced with the conflicting fact that their insight 
is growing more limited and that they are becoming increasingly 
dependent on the advice of scientifically trained experts.
A lexander King (cf. B.C. van Houten, 1970:254 ff.) has pointed 
out that the dependence of politics on science establishes itself in 
seven areas:
(1) The “scientization” of war.
(2) The way in which a state can dem onstrate scientific and tech­
nological advances for the sake of its own prestige.
(3) The shrinking of the world as a result of ever more effective 
and revolutionary developments in comm unication techniques.
(4) The growing influence of science on economic growth.
(5) The prom otion of international co-operation as a result of the 
ever-increasing costs of scientific research.
(6) Changes in daily life resulting from the ever-expanding 
growth in standard of living — as a result of scientific develop­
ments.
(7) The higher demands exacted from education.
This interdependence of science and politics implies a radical 
reorientation of traditional attitudes and convictions. As far as 
politics is concerned, the reorientation is essential because it is no
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longer possible to direct politics exclusively from the confines of 
the Cabinet or of Parliament. The reason for this lies in the fact 
that local and international events have made long-term planning 
imperative. This planning cannot be effected only at parliam enta­
ry level. It has to  be done in co-operation with extra-parliamenta­
ry experts. The demand by politicians for “ experience” and 
“prophetic insight” , has become a relative m atter because of 
developments within our “science-orientated culture” . It is be­
coming increasingly apparent that only those who are experts in 
specific areas, such as education or economics, and who can cope 
effectively and responsibly with specific situations, can expect 
the necessary public acknowledgement. The concept of the “ all­
rounder” , as developed especially in conjunction with the Bri­
tish parliamentary system, and which gave rise to  the practice of 
the interchangeability of portfolios, has become functionally 
less acceptable in our “ science-orientated culture” and will be­
come even less so in future. Whether politicians want to  accept it 
or not, politics has gained the added dimension of subject exper­
tise — a dimension which will increasingly be demanded of the 
responsible politicians.
Because the fundamentals of our life-style, its very nature and 
continuation, have become dependent on science, politics has by 
the same token become dependent on scientifically-based advice 
and information when it comes to  m atters like policy, planning 
and projections o f the future. This dependence can obviously not 
be lim ited to “ technical” matters, such as the building o f bridges 
or the solution of monetary questions, but also includes socio­
political and social issues such as the building of bridges between 
various population groups and the design of strategies and 
structures which would honour hum an dignity. That politicians 
are invariably agreeable to  accepting expert advice on technical 
m atters, but follow their ideological noses, proverbially speaking, 
on m atters of socio-political issues, could well be termed a trage­
dy. The result has been, regrettably, that many of their findings 
on sensitive socio-political questions have been sorely lacking in 
judgem ent. It often happens, of course, in South Africa, that
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members of the university corps are called upon to constitute 
commissions of inquiry in various fields. The time has probably 
come, not only to call upon academic experts to give advice, but 
also to include them in m atters of execution. It would have the 
advantage of inspring a sorely needed sensitivity in the prof­
fering of expert advice in the practical political arena.
As a result of the “scientization” of the most im portant proces­
ses and areas within contem porary society, the problem areas, 
functions and responsibilities of the m odem  politician have in­
creased both quantitively and qualitatively. They have increased 
quantitatively in the sense that he is called upon to make deci­
sions in more areas than before and that more issues require his 
attention. Qualitatively there has been an increase as a result of 
the increasing complexity surrounding political decision-making. 
The m ajority of problems confronting contem porary politicians, 
cannot merely be classified as simple political issues. They also 
involve o ther “ layers” or “ stra ta” , such as technico-organiza- 
tional, economic and strategic. Because “ stratified issues” cannot 
be viewed summarily as simple problems, the politician is of 
necessity dependent on experts in analyzing and solving complex 
problems. Should he fail to consult them , he would either stagger 
from one catastrophic decision to the other, or become the rub­
ber stamp of a bureaucratic apparatus.
The role that science can assume, is obviously not confined to 
problem-analyses and the making-available of advice and infor­
m ation to  the politician: it can also extend itself to the levels of 
com m unication and democratic opinion forming. This aspect is 
given special emphasis by, among others, Jurgen Habermas. He 
places a high premium on the principles o f interaction and dialo­
gue as a basis for democracy and concludes as a result that 
science and the universities should act as channelling agents of 
inform ation on the public forum. Incorrect and inadequate in­
form ation is, after all, one of the most effective obstacles to po­
litical m aturity and democratic opinion making. Im portant in­
form ation is far too often withheld from the public in the guise
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of so-called public interest. This procedure not only sabotages 
democracy, but necessarily contributes to political immaturity 
and apathy. In an attem pt to bridge this comm unication gap 
effectively, universities should increase the search for effective 
means of communication.
Practitioners of science — especially philosophers — will have to 
demonstrate their expertise and insight by “ translating” their ter­
minological jargon into a language which would be intelligible 
to the wider public, especially when it concerns information im­
portant to democratic opinion making. The m yth that science 
should necessarily be unintelligible to the layman, has become 
intolerable snobbery in our emerging science-culture.
From what I have said so far it need not necessarily be deduced 
that I am of the opinion that politics could be completely 
“scientized” , a point of view supported by technocrats. This, 
however, is a m atter which cannot be explored in detail in the 
limited space at my disposal. Politics has, indeed, to  a great ex­
ten t and in im portant spheres, become a m atter of scientific 
planning. It does not seem possible for science to  alleviate, let 
alone eliminate completely, problems of political decision 
making. Science could, however, delineate political problems 
more clearly and by so doing permit a streamlining of decisions 
and solutions. This, of course, does not necessarily eliminate 
political decisions, as will appear from the following example. 
The present energy crisis is a political dilemma of universal 
magnitude. Scientists in various countries are at this very m o­
m ent struggling with this problem and searching for alternatives. 
The politician will ultimately have to make a choice from among 
the array of alternatives. Though his scope of decisions has 
broadened, it has not become less complicated or merely “ tech­
nical” .
Of course it is not merely a m atter of politics becoming depen­
dent on science — the reverse is also true. In our “science-orienta­
ted culture” , von H um boldt’s ideal of an autonom ous science,
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with regard to which the state can have at most a forma] structur­
ing function, has apparently become an impossibility. In practice 
it is becoming ever more essential to involve the state in priority 
planning which will ultim ately be of influence on the develop­
ment of science itself. Karl Acham (1972:44 ff) writes as follows 
on this m atter: “ In future, more than ever, we will have to keep 
the following state of affairs in mind at universities and other 
institutions: research has become a ‘politicum ’ of major im por­
tance. And this is true in m ore ways than one: Firstly, modern 
research has, because of its m agnitude, the expenses involved in 
its projects and apparatus required, exceeded all bounds of 
normal investiture. Secondly, efforts to  eliminate purely theore­
tical research in favour of practical relevant research and to un­
derstand research as a direct, economically relevant production 
force, have been increased” .
It is an indisputable fact that research — and I should add also in 
the social sciences and humanities — has become prohibitively 
expensive. The vast volume of research, especially that of an ex­
perimental-empirical nature, has become an onerous financial 
burden to  universities — the consequences of which have as yet 
no t been fully realized. It is a fact that the traditional ideal of 
university autonom y and academic freedom is being threatened 
by the emerging reality of a “scientized society” . The well- 
known Senator Fulbright (1968:41) contends that universities 
who involve themselves in topical problems of government, will 
acquire an added commercial dimension and lose their typical 
educational character. According to him the natural or exact 
sciences are being favoured at the expense of the social sciences, 
and in the latter case emphasis on the behavioural school will in­
crease at the expense of a more traditional and more human ap­
proach.
The implications of the mounting expenses involved in empirical 
research specifically, are becoming increasingly clear. One of 
these is state involvement in determining priorities of science, not
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only because of financial and co-ordinating considerations, but 
against the background of differing aims which will in future be 
relevant to  scientific research. This prom pts the argument that 
modern science, because of its function and position in society 
and as a result of the technological orientation of our society, 
possesses socio-political and economic implications which can no 
longer be ignored. H.P. Bahrdt (1964:176) is of the opinion that 
the m ost im portant implication of science and technology’s in­
filtration into almost all facets of society, is that the role of state 
authorities has changed from that of patron of the arts to that of 
policy-maker.
This change is of fundamental concern to universities. It 
emphasises the importance of an effective and comprehensive 
science-policy. This policy cannot be determined by the state 
solely on autocratic lines, bu t will have to  be form ulated by co­
operative interaction between state and university, and possibly 
additional interested parties. The importance of such a policy 
is intensified as it becomes progressively obvious that society no 
longer regards universities as “untouchable” , bu t does in fact 
cherish justified expectations. Personally, I regard the degree to 
which universities can cope with these expectations and demands 
as their greatest single challenge. The whole question of the uni­
versity’s relevance is intimately involved with this challenge.
The university in general and the scientist in particular can today 
no longer lay claim to a traditional independence and complete 
autonom y in determining science-policy. Therefore, university 
authorities will have to secure the necessary co-control and 
responsibility when science-policy is determined by the state, 
otherwise they run the risk of being demoted to “choir-boys” of 
commerce and “public servants” of the states.
The fact that the potential of scientific and technological 
developments is increasing more rapidly than the financial means 
to exptoit them , emphasises the topicality of the problem . Of 
necessity this demands a choice, and invariably this proves to  be
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a political one. As long as comm unication between scientists and 
politicians remains at the present inadequate level, this problem 
cannot possibly be solved satisfactorily. Therefore it is regret- 
able that serious obstacles are experienced between scientists 
and politicians on the level of comm unication, especially where 
social scientists are concerned. And sneering references locally to 
“academics” , are certainly not solving the problem either. For 
this and other reasons, relations between scientific-technical 
possibilities and political realities remain static and defective, a 
problem aggravated by the inability of scientists to reason “poli­
tically” , or to “ translate” their insights and results into socio­
political terminology. This, of course, by no means implies a 
politicization of science in a limited sense of the word, rather, 
to quote C.A. van Peursen (1970:254): “Science should main­
tain a relative independence, in order to ensure an equilibrium. 
Broadly speaking, politicization is inevitable. Science has to func­
tion within the total framework of society’s policy-making 
apparatus” .
The adaptation awaiting scientists as a result of our “science- 
orientated culture” is a fundamental one. Many scientists still 
show a “ natural resistance” to the necessity of a science-policy. 
The view is held that scientific research is the “prodigy of the 
unbounded m ind” and that research, consequently, cannot be 
done within the confines of policy, planning and organization. 
This conviction has led many to adopt an attitude of passive 
resignation, something which is justified by the excuse of “ the 
powerlessness of the spirit in these evil tim es” .
I have no doubt that scientists should be delivered from this self­
imposed m artyrdom  in order to participate actively and critically 
in the making of policy for science and society. Instead of 
gloomy predictions from an ivory tower on “ the university’s 
plight in a consumer society” , serious thought and consideration 
should be given to ways and means by which universities could 
stear the direction research should follow and the aims to be con­
sidered in determining science-policy. This, as a m atter of fact,
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holds the promise of new dimensions and functions for univer­
sities. In closing, I would like to draw attention to some of these.
3. The university and the future
The view that a mutual dependence has developed between 
science and politics, and that, as a result, the scientist has 
acquired an added and inevitable social responsibility, has im­
portan t functional implications for universities in a social frame­
work within which science and technology constitute the guiding 
elements. Parallel to  the division between theory and praxis on 
the one hand, and scicnce and politics, which developed in terms 
of the traditional ideal of knowledge for the sake of knowledge 
on the other hand, the fact remains that on an institutional level 
a similar rigid division exists between universities and political 
institutions. In keeping with this division, and in view of the 
principle o f a value-free science, politics became a university sub­
ject —, but as a neutral and apolitical political science. In return 
for this neutrality, the university was granted autonom y, a state 
of affairs which prom pted B.C. van Houten (1970:260) to re­
mark that the university’s autonom y depended increasingly on a 
tacit consensus between the state and the academic corps on the 
question o f the divisibility of science and politics, that is intellec­
tual spirit and the phenom enon of power.
The concept of science that accompanied this traditional idea of 
an “ autonom ous” university, and which determined the relation 
between universities, the state and other institutions of society, 
has been overtaken nowadays by the emergence of our science- 
culture. This is supported by the fact that at present universities 
are having to yield to the increasing demands of government and 
society in return for financial assistance. It is a m atter of grave 
concern that basic research at university level is being impinged 
upon and universities are in danger of becoming conveyor belts of 
commerce and industry. This unfortunate state of affairs is il­
lustrated by the fact that in planning and financing of research-
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projects the “practical benefits” and “utility value” thereof be­
come the main criteria. For this very reason academics who are 
closely involved in processes of production acquire, so to speak, 
an im portant market value. How should one react to this state of 
affairs? The founding of a university which would function inde­
pendent of national interests, as suggested by Staal (1970), is not 
the answer. A preferable solution would be a movement, initiated 
from within university circles, which would point out the neces­
sity of serious discussion on tendencies and priorities of society 
as a whole, and the social values involved in present-day develop­
ments. G.v.N. Viljoen (opening address, RAU, March 4, 1974) 
argues that university members should not only be loyal to their 
fellow man and society, but should also feel compelled to judge 
and criticize their actions and intentions. He should serve his 
comm unity as touchstone, rather than amplifier; not be a mere 
sounding-board or echo slavishly the current ideas his superiors 
and leadership happen to support. He should, with the necessary 
tact, understanding and loyalty, ensure that all aspects of conten­
tious m atters arc given serious public consideration. By an 
ostensibly dissenting and questioning attitude, academics can en­
sure a higher degree of responsibility in decisions made by their 
society. To foster this involvement of the university in general 
and academics in particular, it seems to  my mind a m atter of 
urgency to  introduce interdisciplinary courses at university level 
on m atters relating to our social, political and economic future.
This fact has added a sort of “ radar” activity to the existing 
function of the university, to quote C.A. van Pcursen (1967: 
5): “The university should fulfil, to an increasing extent, a sort 
o f radar function in a rapidly changing society. It should alert and 
educate the public on matters still to come. Science cannot be 
divorced from morality. As yet unthought of possibilities should 
be scanned from the proverbial radar post” . In short, universities 
will have to step-up reconnaissance activity marked by decisions 
of an ethical character, apart from their usual activities of trans­
fer, regeneration and application of knowledge. Accepting the
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responsibility for reconnaissance, does not necessarily implicate 
universities in decisions of a moral, social or political kind. It 
implies, above all, that the university will honour its educational 
charge, by educating people towards responsible decision-making.
Besides having a radar function, or perhaps because of it, univer­
sities will have to provide more deliberately for perm anent educa­
tion in our science-culture. A typical consequence of a science- 
culture is that human life can no longer be divided into a period 
of learning and a period of working. Man must learn while living 
and working, a circumstance which originated because of a rapid­
ly changing world in which knowledge becomes out-dated within 
a short space of time. The urgency of this problem is cha­
racterized by a distress-call recently from a minister of religion, 
pleading in favour of refresher courses at faculties of theology. 
Permanent education is to  my mind a m atter of necessity. Such 
an endeavour by universities would have the added advantage of 
supplying the university with the necessary feed-back by alumni 
on the effectiveness of its teaching programme and techniques. 
The question of feed-back as an aid in the evaluation of teaching 
programmes, techniques and subject m atter, has long been neg­
lected in South Africa. It is characteristic of our older universities 
especially to cling rather fanatically to tradition. Typical of a 
science-culture is its leaning towards the future. This implies that 
universities should stimulate ingenuity and creativity rather than 
merely keep up traditional techniques and knowledge — which 
might, in any case, become obsolete within a short space of time. 
In present-day society, the student who displays ingenuity and 
creativity is better equipped to cope with rapidly changing situa­
tions than the one who is only textbook trained. This student is 
in danger of being relegated to the academic garbage pile, tex t­
book and all.
In our science-culture the university thus faces real challenges 
and special problems. These are not necessarily insurmountable. 
Rather — they open new horizons or dimensions for m an’s 
questing spirit. It cannot be denied that education is, par excel­
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lence, a field in which we already have a finger on the pulse of 
the future. In this regard Georg Picht quite fittingly points out 
that what is at present being done in schools and universities will 
determine, qualitatively and quantitatively, the possibilities open 
to man in twenty years’ time. According to Picht, there is no 
field in which our actions and inactions, our commissions and 
omissions can have such a profound influence on the destiny of 
mankind, than that of education. I would like to express the 
hope that, “qualitatively and quantitatively” , the PU for CHE 
will contribute to what man will have and be in twenty years’ 
time.
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